Does It Matter Where the Captain Grew Up? You Bet
You're in good hands, mate.
Photo: Courtesy of Qantas
Anybody who remembers Dustin Hoffman in Rain Man knows the world's safest airline is Qantas, which has never had a single passenger or flight-crew fatality. One theory is that this unprecedented record, which no other major airline in the world can approach, is in part due to the Australian culture.
Australia has always been proud of its classless society. Nobody in Oz tugs their forelock before speaking up, meaning that in a Qantas cockpit, a 1,500-hour first officer will have no compunctions about telling his 15,000-hour captain that he thinks landing into a thunderstorm (or whatever aeronautical transgression the left-seater is considering committing) is a dumb idea and that he, thank you, is declaring a missed approach.
Not all that long ago, this would have been anathema even in a U. S. cockpit, where captains were gods and copilots were warm-blooded autopilots. That began to change after an infamous crash near Portland, Oregon, in 1978, when the captain of a United Airlines cargo flight circled around trying to troubleshoot a minor mechanical problem long enough that his four-engine DC-8 finally ran out of fuel.
His first officer and flight engineer had both tried to tell him that they were all about to die (which they indeed did), but to no effect. A Qantas right-seater would probably have said, "Roight, mate, we're up a bloody gum tree and we'll be landing now. I've got the airplane, gear down."
What grew out of that, ultimately, was something called CRM, or cockpit resource management: using and selecting the input, opinions, advice, and expertise of everybody in the cockpit, not just the captain. That's the doctrine under which U.S. airline -- and military -- crews operate today.
Too bad there wasn't an Ozzie in the cockpit of the Japan Airlines cargo 747 that crashed at Anchorage, Alaska, in 1977 because its American contract pilot was too drunk to fly and his Japanese copilot and flight engineer was too scared to say so. The captain was so sloshed the taxi driver who took them to the airport called the cops, but it was too late.
Does culture play a role in aviation safety? Interesting question, particularly as American domestic airlines at the end of this week will--barring a last-minute disaster--achieve a 65-percent improvement in their safety record over the last ten years while foreign carriers better their safety records at a substantially slower rate.
The opposite of Qantas cockpit socialization would be those products of strict and authoritarian societies, the Japanese and the Koreans. And yes, there have been several horrific crashes on Japanese and Korean carriers where it was made apparent that a copilot would literally rather die than wrest control from his captain. During the 45 minutes when in 1985 a JAL 747 flew essentially out of control after its vertical tailfin and rudder were blown off by a cabin pressure-vessel failure, the cockpit voice recorder showed that the only word spoken by the copilot in response to the captain's ineffectual commands was "hai" ("yes"). I'll bet a Western first officer would have had some bold ideas and what-the-hell suggestions, whether they worked or not. Ultimately, the 747 hit a ridge near Mount Fuji and killed 520 of the 524 people aboard, the worst single-aircraft death toll ever.
Cockpit resource management would be a concept as baffling to a Japanese airman as would China's feng shui be to an American left-seater.
Though it will inevitably seem racist, it's impossible not to be aware of the fact that some pilots for African airlines had never seen a piece of machinery in their lives before presenting themselves for flight training. After all, one of the reasons offered for the skill and quality of American pilots during World War II was that they'd grown up tinkering on the family Ford and driving John Deere tractors.
There was a crash in Central Africa some years ago when an African airline pilot landed his Boeing 727 on the grass alongside the paved runway of an airport because someone had told him it would prevent tire wear, and tires were expensive in Africa. Many died because the pilot had no idea that landing a 100-ton airliner on sod was roughly equivalent to suddenly deciding to drive a Mercedes limo through a forest at 100 mph.
And in the 21st century, you have to wonder how few Ugandan, Bolivian, Pakistani, Moroccan, Thai, Chinese, and other developing-world pilots grew up playing video games, while they sit in computerized cockpits using game-controller sidesticks that long ago became second nature to Western pilots.
Yes, we're all born equal. But in an air-transport cockpit, the more important thing may be how we grew up.













If culture does indeed play a part in aviation safety, I wonder what it says about American culture when neither the captain nor the first officer of a Bombardier CRJ (Delta/Comair flight 5191 at Lexington, Kentucky) bothered to look at the compass on the top of their control panel to check the alignment of the runway on which they were lining up their aircraft and then wondered why the runway lights weren't on as they began their take-off roll?
And I wonder what it says when a crew -- albeit a tired one -- decides to land in a thunderstorm at Little Rock (American Airlines flight 1420, in 1999) and neither the captain nor the co-pilot notices they have forgotten to deploy the spoilers, with disastrous results?
Even though the U.S. airline industry may be on the verge of demonstrating a 65 percent improvement in its safety record over a 10-year period, there is absolutely no room for complacency or smugness. Some of the human errors made in U.S. accidents are (sadly) mistakes just as basic as those which the author points out have been made by pilots from other countries.
And North American pilots and controllers continue to make mistakes. How close did the aircraft involved in the recent Class A runway incursion incidents at Los Angeles and Fort Lauderdale get to each other on active runways? If they had been 30-40 feet closer, maybe the author wouldn't have dealt with the important issue of pilots' native cultures in quite such a blase way.
Posted by: AirStare | October 02, 2007 at 04:12 PM
Airstare- I'm pretty surprised we're bashing the US and no one else, especially when comparing the NA safety record to the rest of the world (!)
Posted by: rrgg | October 02, 2007 at 07:49 PM
You can find any number of accidents from any number of countries at which to point fingers--and I'm quite familiar with the two you mention--but you seem to have totally missed the point of what I was writing about, which was the possible interrelationship between _some_ accidents and _some_ cultural characteristics.
Oh, and by the way, a pilot doesn't look at "the compass atop his panel" to check runway heading. That's the magnetic "whisky compass" (it floats in alcohol) and is doubtless slewing wildly back and forth a good 90 degrees for a few moments after the airplane has turned onto the runway. what I check is the DG (directional gyro) down on the IP.
Posted by: stepwilk | October 03, 2007 at 02:12 PM
I spent a brief period of time as a Flight Engineer in a 727. We trained in the concept of Cockpit Resource Management. I maintain that Aircraft with a Flight Engineer are safer than 2 Pilot planes. The Co-pilot is usually going to agree with the Captain. But the Flight Engineer is a neutral third party. But now that hardly any 3 crew planes are flying anymore it is a moot point.
But culture is something we are born into. It is not something that is left behind on the ramp when a plane takes to the sky
Ray
Posted by: ray13 | October 04, 2007 at 12:26 AM